The Additional Protocol in the General Debate

As I noted in a previous blog post, while General Debate addresses are formal, prepared and often rather dry, they also give States to summarise world as they see it and where they see themselves going. It also provides an overview, or world map, if you will, of the support for the implementation of Additional Protocols, especially in regions where implementation is weak.

It goes without saying that generally-speaking, States who have not sought approval for an Additional Protocol from the IAEA Board of Governors avoid reference to APs unless they intend to introduce one. The absence of a mention may be based on the fact that the State has no Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (Angola, Israel) or, as in the case of the Brazilian address, may indicate that they have no intention of adding an AP to their CSA in the foreseeable future, as Brazil claims that it cannot because it would lead IAEA inspectors straight into the path of legitimate military secrets. There was, of course, the notable exception of a mention of the AP in the address of Myanmar this week. Addresses can also indicate whether the State wants to bring into force an AP that it has already signed, or pressure other States to do so.

South East Asia, a region in which implementation is patchy, presented a mixed picture, aside from the unusual reference to the AP from Myanmar. Pressure to implement APs may be relaxed because the nuclear power programmes in this region are still largely in their infancy, with Bataan, the Philippine’s nuclear relic, mothballed since 1986.

However, there were two positive mentions in the addresses of the Philippines and Thailand, both countries who have signed APs that have not come into force, the latter of which assured the Conference that they were working towards ratification. This reflects plans to expand the nuclear programmes of both countries, with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand planning two nuclear power plants and the Philippines looking into a possible revival of Bataan. However, it appears that the South East Asian States are aware that, for now, discussion of implementation of safeguards and the AP remains more focussed on the Middle East than their own region. When Indonesia, which does have an AP, stated that it was “concerned that progress has not been as fast as we would have expected on the universalization of safeguards agreements and additional protocols”, this appeared to be mainly in connection to the Middle East NWFZ.

Malaysia, who signed their AP in 2005, the same year as Thailand, made no mention of it or any intention to ratify and maintained a guarded stance towards safeguards, emphasising that safeguards should not impede technological development and expressing support for Iran, whose AP is not currently in force.

There were no surprise mentions of the AP in the addresses of the Middle Eastern States, another region in which implementation is poor. Both Jordan and Iraq mentioned their individual APs, with Jordan having one in place since 1998 and Iraq having signed theirs last year. The United Arab Emirates, who signed their AP in April this year, did not make a speech. Syria and Lebanon, who have no AP, made no mention of it. This may be because the Additional Protocol is not considered a political priority by the Arab States as much as the universalisation of safeguards agreements, as highlighted in the Qatari speech, which, of course means the introduction of safeguards in Israel. This may also explain any reluctance of AP signatory States to talk of universalisation of the protocol, lest they move away from the position of the Arab States. As expected, Iran made no mention of the AP, as this would be to acknowledge that there are outstanding issues on which they have not fully cooperated with the IAEA. For now, the AP remains at lower priority than more politically stirring issues in the Middle East.

Adoption of “Israeli nuclear capabilities”

The resolution “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities” was adopted at the General Conference today, in a tense and occasionally fractious atmosphere, riddled with curt exchanges over procedural issues and points of order. The crux of the resolution is that it “calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards”.  This follows hot on the heels of “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” which was adopted with little resistance last night and proposes a similar idea. However “Israeli Nuclear Capabilities” differs from last night’s resolution significantly in that it makes explicit reference to Israel and “concern about Israeli nuclear capabilities”, and that it was presented for adoption in the draft submitted earlier this week without editing. For these reasons, it was adopted with considerably more difficulty than last night, facing a close call in a no-action motion vote called by Canada, and having cleared that hurdle, passing with a majority of 49 to 45 with 16 abstentions.

This has somewhat soured the buoyant mood for the US and the EU after last night’s hard-won consensus. Naturally, they are loathe to “single-out” Israel, and the US argued on the floor that the previous night’s resolution was sufficient as it was better to stick to “compromise and dialogue rather than confrontation”. The US representative also argued that it would not be productive to once again be “held captive by the rancour” of debates in the Middle East on this issue. The defeat of the no-action motion may have come as a surprise for many, as Sweden asked for a short recess in which the EU could coordinate before the vote on the resolution. This not being permitted after a vote (the procedural matter sticking at 43 – 43 and no abstentions), the EU delegations only got the opportunity to informally coordinate in an aisle of the auditorium during a statement delivered by Israel.  While the adoption of the resolution may be met with disappointment by the US and Sweden who were pleased to have helped forge a consensus the previous night, those who voted in favour broke into applause after the results were announced, and the Arab States and NAM could be seen congratulating each other.

With a margin as tight as 8 votes in the no-motion vote and 4 in the resolution vote, it is clear that this resolution does not signal a sea change, but rather, suggests a numbers game. What differentiates the defeated no-motion action of this year from the successful one of last year is the presence of a handful of no-motion-defeating  African countries (Angola, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Senegal) who were absent for the vote last year, alongside Ethiopia who abstained last year, and Bahrain and Tajikistan. This may be connected to increased lobbying by the Arab States in comparison to previous years.  While Lebanon stated its confidence in the resolution passing, prior to the vote, due to a more weakly-worded and focussed text than in previous years, this may not explain why the resolution was adopted because the text still contains explicit references to Israel. This is also suggested by the fact that no States who supported the no-motion last year were convinced enough to switch their vote to defeat it this year. While the adoption of the resolution may not exactly be making history, it nevertheless constitutes part of a successful Conference for the Arab States, especially considering that the “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” and “Israeli nuclear capabilities” initiatives have experienced a difficult few years.

Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East

Yesterday in a session that adjourned at 8 pm, the plenary voted in favour for a resolution on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East. The resolution, sponsored by Egypt and tabled annually since the early 90s, has recently become an annual stikcing point for the conference. Virtually all other formal meetings scheduled in afternoon sessions were adjourned so that delegates can join the plenary for the vote.

Last year’s resolution had many amendments and counter-amendments tabled from the floor with endless rounds of voting. The air this year was far less confrontational and the progression to the vote was rather smooth. The outcome was part of a strong mediation effort by GC presidency (New Zealand), the US and Sweden (EU presidency). Mediation efforts took place early on with shuttle efforts between delegations and intensified through several side meetings on the sides of the conference. The US direct involvement is widely understood to have been key towards that outcome. The US, which abstained in the final vote, was very close to voting in favour of the draft proposed. Their final decision to abstain was taken in direct consultation with Washington.

A separate vote was requested by Israel on the operative paragraph two. The paragraph calls upon all countries in the region, without naming any, to accede to the NPT. 104 countries voted for the paragraph with 4 abstentions while Israel voted against. It is noteworthy that Pakistan voted in favour of the paragraph. Pakistanis are usually reluctant, in many fora including the GC, to endorse language supporting the NPT. India with similar concerns abstained. It is not clear what was behind the Pakistani vote on the NPT language in the session.

The main amendment this year involved article 9 the subject of which is a source of regional contestation. The Israeli position insists on a sequential approach to the establishment of the nuclear weapons free zone. In Israel’s view efforts for establishment of the zone should only follow comprehensive peace and reconciliation in the region. On the other hand, it is the view of Arab countries that efforts towards the zone should run in tandem with the peace process and can even support and strengthen the drive towards peace. The resolution adopted carefully worded the differences as follows: ‘ Mindful of the importance of establishing the Middle East as a nuclear weapons free zone, an in this context, emphasizing the importance of establishing peace therein ‘. While this language does not conclusively settle the issue, it was this formulation that allowed 103 votes for the resolution, none against and 4 abstentions and consequently its adoption.

Myanmars Mysterious Reference

The Union of Myanmar today took the floor of the General Conference. In its statement, the country referred to its 2007 Cooperation Agreement with the Russian Federation on the construction of a small pool-type research reactor. It stated, quite clearly, that the implementation of this agreement has not yet started. A while ago, this was reported by journalist Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel, quoting a senior Russian industry official (IAEA Probes Myanmar data, discourages new research reactors, NuclearFuel, August 10, 2009, p3-4).

Interestingly, Myanmar did mention that the IAEA had visited the country in November 2008 for  a seminar on the safeguards system. That meeting had focussed on the application of safeguards under an amended small quantities protocol  and additional protocol. Myanmar’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, reproduced in INFCIRC/477, entered into force on 20 April 1995. There are no safeguarded nuclear facilities in Myanmar, so it has a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) attached to this agreement. It still hasn’t amended its SQP (see this article by Jan Lodding and Bernardo Ribeiro for more information on what that means).

There was no reference in Myanmar’s statement as to what it intends to do next. Hopefully, though, the country will sign up the modified SQP. Myanmar’s regulatory framework is quite weak. Nuclear activities are governed by an “Atomic Energy Council” lead by the Minister of Science and Technology (led by minister U Thaung). This law has a framework character, and simply lies out the fundamentals. More work is probably underway on establishing the necessary infrastructure. For instance, work on strengthening the countries regulatory system is progressing under the IAEA’s technical cooperation program. For instance, some two years ago, the Agency started a project together with Myanmar to “strengthen the national capability for improvement of radiation protection infrastructure”.

The General Debate

The General Debate, following the D-G speeches, in the Conference Plenary had its greatest audience on Monday, as delegates were keen to listen to the most politically-salient addresses of the week, mostly scheduled for the first two sessions. It is typical for the Plenary to have a full house at the beginning of the week for the formal opening of the Conference, and at the end of the week, when the fates of the draft resolutions carved out throughout the week are decided by vote amongst the Member States. It is also typical for the Plenary to experience a midweek lull as the General Debate continues, often into night sessions, with heads of national delegations reading prepared statements. During these times, the auditorium is at peak half-full while the real work of the Conference is hammered out elsewhere.

While the General Debate naturally renders few surprises (an address among a schedule of many in an auditorium half full with junior officials is no place to deliver big news), it gives states an opportunity to report on their activities with the Agency over the past year, and to restate their positions, in digestible summary, as to how they see themselves, their place in the landscape of nonproliferation, and their relationship with the IAEA. By way of example, the Russian address given by Sergey Kirienko, the head of Rosatom, made little mention of safeguards, but restated Russia’s commitment to bilateral technical cooperation with states, expressly mentioning Iran, retrenching Russia’s staunchly independent policy when it comes to states with outstanding safeguards issues.

It is also a chance for States to state their formal position on items on the Conference agenda. An item may be formalised into a draft resolution by its sponsors, and then circulated for negotiation and alteration in working groups and the CoW before it enters the Plenary to be voted on. During the General Debate, States sometimes use their address to justify items they have sponsored or air their grievances about items they feel strongly about and this can lead to what essentially amounts to a rather stiff pre-drafted spat in the Plenary. On Monday, Hassan Younis, Egyptian Minister for Electricity and Energy, used his address to defend Egypt’s sponsorship of its draft resolution, “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East”, arguing that non-implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, presumably in reference to Israel, constitutes a “dysfunction in implementation of safeguards”, and criticised IAEA members for failing to pass the resolution in previous years, citing “non-substantive and non-objective objections”. On Tuesday, Shaul Chorev, Director General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, took the opportunity to respond to Egypt’s draft resolution, countering that such a proposal could only come about through arrangements made within the Middle East region. In addition to this, Chorev also rebutted two supplementary items entitled “Israeli nuclear capabilities”, submitted by the Arab states, which is doing the rounds as a draft resolution, and “Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction”, submitted by Iran, a draft resolution for which has not seen the light of day, dismissing the Iranian proposal as a case of “wishful thinking”. This, in turn, prompted a use of the right of reply from Iran, who pointed out that Israel is not a signatory to the NPT. For the most part, the General Debate has been relatively spat-free, as other States shy away from debate and choose to use the podium to summarise their activities in technical cooperation and civilian nuclear safety.

The General Conference at its 53rd

On Monday 14 September, senior representatives from 150 Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) converged on a new hall in the Vienna International Conference for the five-day annual IAEA General Conference (GC). The annual conference, typically convened in September, considers and approves the Agency´s work programme and budget and decides on other matters brought before it by the Board of Governors, the Director General, or Member States.

The GC involves a web of intricate, parallel and related meetings that can seem daunting at first glance. Indeed much time is lost in the corridors deciding which meetings to attend and which to sacrifice. The Conference, which hosts all IAEA membership, convenes in one of three different configurations. The plenary is the ultimate decision making body of the conference and the seat of all authority. All other activities during the conference have ultimately to funnel through the plenary. Out of the plenary two committees branch out: the General Committee and the Committee Of the Whole, embarrassingly known as COW.

The General Committee has fewer elected membership and is the forum where major procedural issues are discussed. The committee forwards its recommendations on procedural issues to the plenary. These include, among other things, recommendations pertaining to the conference agenda, allocation of agenda items to committees as well as examining delegate’s credentials. The General Committee does not engage with matters of substance. The COW is the main committee in the GC. It is composed of the IAEA full membership and gives recommendations to the plenary on the course of action to be adopted on agenda items under its consideration. Along with plenary and committee meetings, there are numerous closed meetings for regional groups to coordinate positions as well as closed drafting groups. Since 1998, a scientific Forum has been organized in parallel with the conference. This year the forum is organized under the title ‘Energy for Development’. Along the margins of the conference various lunch seminars are also organized trying to attract delegates between meetings.

The first day of the conference plenary is usually heavy on ceremonial and procedural issues. However, this year it has an interesting twist. The conference takes place at a time when change is underway at the Agency’s helm with election of a new Director General (DG). The day started with election of Ms Jennifer MacMillan, Governor and Resident Representative of New Zealand, as President of the Conference. The Conference also elected 8 delegates as vice presidents, elected other members for the General Committee and the British Ambassador Simon Smith to chair the all too important Committee Of the Whole. The conference also approved by consensus membership applications submitted by Cambodia and Rwanda; bringing the IAEA membership to152 states.

 Following the UN secretary General annual message of support to the conference, outgoing Director General Elbaradie was invited to the podium to give what is to be his last address to the GC before his term expires this November. In his speech, Elbaradie looked back on the achievements of his 12 year tenure with pride and a sense of accomplishment. He counted various examples of Agency projects that enhanced developing countries’ access to civilian applications of nuclear technology. He also proudly expanded on the Agency’s role in helping to enhance safety and security of nuclear material. Indeed, who can dispute that IAEA is now a household Acronym. He did not miss the reference to IAEA/UNSCOM verification effort in Iraq. It was with pride that he announced that, time has vindicated the Agency’s positions and findings on Iraq. He made a point in stressing the importance of the Agency’s independence and as a reliable source of impartial factual information.

 However, the picture Elbaradie painted of his agency was not all rosy. In making frequent and nostalgic references to his first speech as DG in 1998, he stressed that many of the issues he adamantly pushed forward are still animating the international agenda despite the 12 years. DPRK, lack of progress on disarmament and the ‘perennial problem’ of inadequate agency funding and legal authority are but some of what he mentioned. On safeguards and verification, his picture is more of persistent and enduring challenges than one of self-congratulation. He outlined ‘major shortcomings’ in the agency’s legal authority that hinders the agency from carrying out what it is expected to do. With its limited means, the Agency is battling against the odds to secure essential state-of the art technology. In particular he mentions the agency’s need to be able to independently validate environmental samples. Moreover, caught between a growing staff base as a response to expansion of the agency’s inspection burden, the agency seems to suffer from a perennial funding issues and reluctant yet demanding donors.

As with most of Elbaradie’s speeches, the nexus between development and security, disarmament and the non-proliferation regime were all too present. Elbaradie envisions a possible verification role for the Agency in nuclear disarmament. That role, he suggests, can be a ‘natural extension’ to the agency’s role. Elbaradie also outlined his vision for a role for the Security Council in a comprehensive rule-based compliance mechanism. He also emphasized the Council’s responsibility in addressing the ‘demand side’ of the proliferation dynamic. Addressing various insecurities and prioritizing a preventive agenda to consolidate peace in the most vulnerable of places should be amongst the Council’s non-proliferation tool box. The long-time Agency civil servant and outgoing DG farewell speech was met with a long round of applause from delegates many of whom had not experienced the agency under another DG. Various statements from regional groups commended Elbaradie’s efforts. And, following on a Board of Governors recommendation, Elbaradie was given the title ‘DG Emeritus’ in appreciation of his 12 years at the top post in the IAEA. Although the title is honorary and does not have formal implications, many sounded the view that Elbaradie should continue to pledge his knowledge and dedication to the Agency.

Procedures to approve the appointment of the next DG followed. Yukiya Amano, the career diplomat and Japan’s Permanent Representative to the Agency till August this year, was elected July this year by the Board of Governors. His election has to be approved by the GC and the plenary approved his appointment by consensus. Following standard procedures, Amano took a formal oath pledging to discharge the functions of the DG with only the interest of the agency in view. He pledged ‘not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of [his] duties from any Government or other authority external to the Agency’.

In addressing the conference as DG-elect, Amano stressed the ever-changing circumstances surrounding the Agency’s mission. From increased risk of nuclear proliferation to the increased demand on peaceful nuclear applications, these changes are primarily global in nature; and because of that, the agency is well suited to tackle them. He further emphasized the importance of drawing on the Agency’s comparative advantages as an inclusive stakeholder’s forum. In stressing his inclusive approach, Amano also acknowledged the role of civil society and pledged to extend partnerships with the third sector.

 A consistent message in Amano’s address was that the agency should not be confined to any particular one of its mandates. Due emphasis should be placed on the Agency’s ‘dual-objective’: ensuring non-proliferation and promoting peaceful uses and technical cooperation. The Agency should not be geared towards pursuing one of those objectives at the exclusion of others but has to address them both in a balanced manner. Amano also pledged to maximise the use of the Agency’s limited budget. On internal Agency issues, he undertook to swiftly address duplication and to enhance efficiency within the Agency’s ranks. He also expressed his intentions to improve communications between the Agency and member states; however, the details of such plans were not disclosed.

It is noteworthy that Amano has, more than once in his statement, referred to his DG duties as ‘Chief Administrative Officer’. One would wonder whether that was intentionally flagged to signal how Amano intends to run the Agency. Amano’s predecessor was frequently perceived as challenging the boundaries of his mandate. Amano, in framing his role in those terms, signals what many predict to be a stark difference of approaches between him and his predecessor on how to manage the organization and its political capital. Only time would tell.

Following the statements, the floor was opened to the conference’s ‘General Debate’. Each delegation is allowed a max of 15 mins to address its positions and activities on issues relevant to the Agency’s mandate and the result is usually a very long speakers list. While the general debate was underway in the plenary, the General Committee was considering the provisional agenda. This year provisional agenda included two supplemental items. One was an item on the ‘Threat of Israel’s Nuclear Capabilities’ proposed by the Arab group while the other on the ‘Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction’ proposed by Iran. The provisional agenda with the two supplemental items were adopted as the Conference Agenda.

The General Committee also referred annual recurring agenda itemsto the Committee of the Whole for delegates’ deliberations. Significant among those are items on strengthening the safeguards and application of the model additional protocol, nuclear safety and nuclear security . Debates and positions on those resolutions have been increasingly heated as of late. Last year, the Committee of the Whole did not reach consensus on the annual draft resolution on the strengthening safeguards and adoption of Additional Protocol nor on the draft resolution on nuclear security. Resolutions under those items had to be presented to the plenary where they were subjected to a vote and were passed with a majority despite various efforts to reach consensus text. More will be clear as the conference unfolds and delegates go into drafting mode.

Two visions – one organization

It is never easy to compare two speeches. Especially if one is made by a seasoned diplomat with 12 years of leading the IAEA under his belt, and the other is made by a Director-General-elect eager to follow in his footsteps.

The IAEA is a difficult organisation to run. The Director-General answers to some 150 member states, and is responsible for a multinational staff, several thousand heads strong. The IAEA’s mission is diverse. It has to please nuclear workers asking for better codes on safety and management. It has to supply technical assistance to those member states who seek to develop their nuclear industry. And it has to make sure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes. It does all this, and more, on a shoestring budget, restricted by harsh staff policies, and faced with an emerging disconnect between what states demand, and the organisation itself can possibly supply.

It is an economic law that one way to increase supply is to reduce marginal costs. For many years, the IAEA has been forced to do this. ElBaradei’s statement yesterday, that safeguards has undergone a “transformation” should be read in that light. He correctly pointed out that the Agency ”have moved beyond simple verification of declared nuclear material at declared facilities to assessing information on a State´s entire nuclear programme and, most importantly, verifying the absence of undeclared activities”. This qualitative improvement has been brought about by a combination of member states’ awareness of the problem of undeclared nuclear fuel cycles, but also by member states’ wish to get more while paying less.

‘Integrated safeguards’ is a simple scheme trying to combine the measures under the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the measures of the additional protocol. The rationale is straightforward: if the IAEA can draw a conclusion that there is no undeclared activities in a state, it can move towards reducing the routine inspection effort in that state. The idea is that member states will get the same assurance as before, but at a lesser cost. At present, 40 states are implementing ‘integrated safeguards’. However, so far, member states have seen no particular savings. There may be many reasons for this: foremost that it is a new concept, and that start-up costs may be high. But some members are starting to complain. One reason why European members were sceptical to a drastic increase in the IAEA’s safeguards budget was this: “we were supposed to pay less, so why are we now paying more?”

ElBaradei pointed out that “universal adherence by all non-nuclear-weapon States to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols is a prerequisite for an effective verification and non-proliferation system.” This is something the IAEA have been pushing ever since the conclusion of project 93+2 back in the early 1990s. It is frustrating, after all, to have produced a shiny new sports-car only to find that not everyone wants it. The Additional Protocol is important since it represents the move from the old accountancy-based safeguards system to a leaner, newer, information driven safeguards regime. The Additional Protocol does provide additional confidence that nuclear material is not used for nefarious purposes. And it is very effective, which was proved by IAEA verification activities in Iran while that country provisionally applied it.

ElBaradei wants to go further, however. In his final speech to the General Conference, he pointed towards a lacuna in the safeguards regime, highlighted by VERTIC a couple of years ago. ElBaradei said, “although the Agency´s verification mandate is centred on nuclear material, to preclude the possibility of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a country, it may be necessary for us to pursue alleged weaponization activities”. Dr. ElBaradei could not have said this while he was Director-General, since this is the hottest potato of them all. Investigations into weaponization cannot be made through accountancy, which means that the IAEA needs to employ methods similar to those used by law enforcement: interviews, forensics and reliance on member-state supplied intelligence. For some members, this is clearly a bridge too far.

Intrusive investigations lead to controversy. Dr. ElBaradei recognizes this in his speech. He highlighted that “we must let diplomacy and thorough verification take their course, however lengthy and tiresome the process might be. We need to carefully assess the veracity of intelligence information so as not to let verification turn into a witch hunt.” The latter point is extremely important, and relates both to the way the IAEA safeguards its independence and the way the organisation handles potentially sensitive information.

Anyone who has been involved in traditional law enforcement knows that evidence collection, collation and analysis requires straddling a fine line between sharing and withholding information from the general public. Without the public, the police may find itself without leads. The key is to ensure a strict chain of custody of collected information and, naturally, to refuse outside influence when it is time to draw conclusions. The worst sin of any investigator is to see too much in the evidence. So far, the IAEA has managed to maintain its impartiality, but it cannot allow itself to lower its guard.

Finally, the Director-General pointed out that the IAEA cannot do its job in isolation. It has to have proper backing by the UN Security Council. ElBaradei identified the problem: “The Council needs to develop a comprehensive compliance mechanism that does not rely only on sanctions, which too often hurt the vulnerable and the innocent”. But he clearly has not figured out the solution. I am personally looking forward to his future thoughts on this, and whether he is hinting at the concept of a “standing resolution” often discussed in Washington DC.

Ambassador Yukiya Amano also mentioned safeguards in his inaugural address to the General Conference. His speech was understandably more measured. He said that the membership needs to “universalizing and further strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially the Agency’s safeguards system”, but fell short of presenting any ideas of how this might be done. He also said that “safeguards agreements with states must be implemented fully, professionally, and impartially with the full cooperation from all the states concerned”, which is an obvious truth.

Those seeking anything inspiring from the incoming DG was probably slightly disappointed. But they should bear in mind before they cast judgement that the acceptance speech is neither the time nor the place to roll out grand initiatives. The Director-Generals have traditionally reserved this to their first “own” General Conference.

We will likely hear more from Ambassador Amano at the 54th General Conference next year.

VERTIC coverage of the IAEA General Conference

VERTIC will field a delegation of three to cover the upcoming IAEA General Conference. Andreas Persbo will lead the team comprising himself, Hassan ElBahtimy, the Centre’s nuclear researcher, and Charlotte Spencer-Smith, a student with the Vienna Diplomatic Academy who has volunteered to help out with the coverage. Updates from the Conference will be posted to this blog.

The 53d General Conference will be outgoing IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei’s last before he hands over the helm to Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan. State parties are expected to discuss a wide range of issues, perhaps most importantly the Agency’s budget.

There are, of course, limitations to our reporting. We will, for instance, not report on deliberations behind closed doors except in the most general of terms. But we hope to draw out the main themes of the conference, as well as the many discussions expected in the corridors of the Austria Centre (the traditional conference venue).